Institute of Information Theory and Automation

Shepley's and Partially-Shapley's Axiomatics with Restricted Symmetry

Lecturer: Mgr. Aleš Antonín Kuběna, Ph.D.
Date and time: 20.10.2014 - 14:00
Room: 25
Department: Decision Making Theory (MTR)


According to a Shapley's game-theoretical result, there exists a unique game-value of cooperative games that satisfy axioms on additivity, efficiency, null-player property and symmetry. The original setting requires the symmetry with respect to arbitrary permutations of the players. If we weaken the symmetry axiom to a symmetry with respect to a subgroup G of the permutation group S_n, the uniqueness of the game-value is satisfied if and only if the group G satisfies a special following "supertransitivity" property. Moreover, for an arbitrary hypergraph H, the Shapley's value is a unique G-symmetric quasivalue of a linear subspace. For more information see the attached PDF invitation.


KubenaSeminar.pdf50.04 KB
Institute of Information Theory and Automation