Institute of Information Theory and Automation

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Bibliography

Journal Article

Representing Strategic Games and Their Equilibria in Many-Valued Logics

Běhounek Libor, Cintula Petr, Fermüller C., Kroupa Tomáš

: Logic Journal of the IGPL vol.24, 3 (2016), p. 238-267

: GAP402/12/1309, GA ČR, 7AMB13AT014, GA MŠk, GF15-34650L, GA ČR, P25417-G15, Austrian Science Fund, I1897-N25, Austrian Science Fund

: strategic games, many-valued logics, Nash equilibria, Lukasiewicz games

: 10.1093/jigpal/jzw004

(eng): We introduce the notion of logical A-games for a fairly general class of algebras A of real truth-values. This concept generalizes the Boolean games as well as the recently defined Lukasiewicz games of Marchioni and Wooldridge. We demonstrate that a wide range of strategic n-player games can be represented as logical A-games. Moreover we show how to construct, under rather general conditions, propositional formulas in the language of A that correspond to pure and mixed Nash equilibria of logical A-games.

: BA

2019-01-07 08:39